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Experimental Success and the Revelation of Reality:
The Miracle Argument for Scientific Realism
Illartin Carrier
Abstract. The paper addresses the so-called miracle argument in favor of scientific
realism and examines the viability of scientific reahsm as an explanation for the suc-
cess of science. Scientific realism is committed to the claims that the theoretical terms
in the mature sciences typically refer to real objects and that the theoretical laws in
such sciences are typically approximately true. Instrumentalism or non-realism draws
an the principles that factual claims need to be confirmed empirically and that ex-
perience fails to single out true assumptions. The miracle argument says that if a the-
ory referred to fictitious objects, it would he miraculous that it is able to correctly
predict observable effects. This argument transforms scientific realism into a hy-
pothesis that is testable by the history of science. 1 perform such tests and conclude
that the only type of realism that appears to be in agreement with the historical re-
cord is "reahsm of natural Kinds." Theories that enjoy distinguished explanatory suc-
cess truthfully establish equivalence relations among phenomena.
1 Instrumentalism and Realism
It is part of the human condition that man's striving may come to grief. This
experience of real resistance is conceded by everyone . Sometimes reality is
such that out aspirations are thwarted. But this experience of impediment is
of limited import in a double respect. First, it is purely negative. One only
recognizes what cannot be achieved. Second, it is merely empirical. One is re-
stricted to learning about the observable conditions of failure. Conversely
speaking, no trustworthy information is obtained as to how the observations
in question come about. Nothing positive is known about the machinery that
keeps the action going. Ort the non-realist or instrumentalist position, this re-
striction to experience characterizes the scientific endeavor as a whole. No
scientific account can reliably penetrate the inner workings of nature and dis-
close the contrivances behind the appearances.
According to this instrumentalist approach, scientific theories are nothing
but tools or instruments that allow us to capture experiences systematically
and economically and to control the phenomena. The instrumentalist conten-
tion is that these aims characterize the justifiable epistemic ambitions of sei-
ence completely. Nobody would deny, after all, that economy of thought and
capacity of intervention are among the aims of science. In particular, all scien-
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tific realists would unhesitatingly agree. The issue is whether further epistemic
aims can legitimately be attributed to science.
On the realist stante, the primary epistemic aim of science is to arrive at
true theories. For this so-called scientific realism, quantities that are non-
observable but successfully assumed in science can be expected to possess an
approximate counterpart in reality. In particular, theory realism claims that
such non-observable quantities which figure in successful scientific theories
refer to real entities. Such theories manage to disclose the reality behind the
appearances. An important reason advanced in favor of this position is that
successful theories in the mature sciences are simply too good not to be true.
For instance, using the hypotheses of electrons and electromagnetic Fields,
scientific theory explains a large number of diverse observations about elec-
tricity in a precise and unified fashion. This excellent achievement, as the ar-
gument goes, makes it inevitable to assume that the entities invoked exist in
reality.
2 The Instrumentalist Argument
Non-realism is frequently adopted an two sorts of principles, namely, empiri-
cism and the so-called Duhem-Quine thesis. It is stated, First, that all knowl-
edge about matters of fact is to be judged empirically. Experience is the only
basis for testing and confirming assumptions with factual bearing. It is
claimed, second, that the truth of theoretical hypotheses cannot unambigu-
ously be appraised an this empirical basis alone. This latter view arises from
Pierre Duhem's argument against the conclusiveness of theory testing in the
early 20th century (Duhem 1906, chap. 10) and is stressed by Willard Van
Orman Quine from the 1950s onward (Quine 1953; Quine/Ullian 1970,
chap. 6-7; sec Gillies 1992, chap. 5). The combination of their views is often
denoted as Duhem-Quine-thesis; it states, roughly speaking, that logic and
experience fall to single out true hypotheses.
The pivot of the pertinent argument is the limited import of empirical
tests of theoretical hypotheses. Two obstacles stand in the way. No theory
can uniquely be positively distinguished an empirical grounds alone since
there are always empirically equivalent, but theoretically distinct and incom-
patible theoretical alternatives. If a hypothetico-deductive theory test is
passed, the result does not provide a basis for the exclusion of all alternative
accounts. The inference from die truth of the observed consequences to the
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truth of theoretical principles employed for their derivation would fall victim
to the fallacy of affirming the consequent. False premises may imply true
consequences. Ptolemaic astronomv could accommodate echpse data, and
Newtonian corpuscular optics accounted for the reflection, refraction and
dispersion of light.
The room left for positive confirmation of theories by this underdetermi-
nation argument is paralleled with respect to refutation by what is called Du-
hem's problem. Duhem argues that no theoretical hypothesis can be refuted
using only logic and experience. The reason is that each empirical test of a
hypothesis proceeds by invoking a large number of additional assumptions
and auxiliary hypotheses so that a deviant observation falls to identify unam-
biguously the mistaken principle. The only legitimate inference is that an er-
ror lies somewhere in this network of intertwined hypotheses; nothing is im-
plied as to its location. Notwithstanding declarations to the contrary,
Foucault's 1849 experiment concerning the velocity of light in media of dif-
ferent indexes of refraction failed to refute the assumption of the particulate
nature of light. It generated an anomaly for the corpuscular theory, to be sure,
but it is Safe to assume that theory and data could have been brought into ac-
cordance by adapting auxiliaries referring, for example, to the interaction be-
tween light and matter or to the mode of Operation of the indication proc-
esses (the measuring instruments) (Duhem 1906, sec. 10.2).
The upshot of the instrumentalist argument is that the test procedures
employed for evaluating scientific theories do not allow for a cogent determi-
nation of the truth value of hypotheses. Hypothetico-deductive testing leaves
room for a falsely positive and falsely negative assessment alike, which uncer-
tainty thwarts any claim as to the supreme trustworthiness and reliability of
theoretical principles. Given these limitations, the argument says, it is un-
founded and mere hubris to assume that successful theories mirror reality.
3 Realism as an Explanation for the Success of Science
Realists attempt to counter the instrumentalist argument by contending that
there can be convincing empirical grounds for transcending experience and
for making existente claims concerning theoretical quantities. The prototypi-
cal argument to this effect is the so-called "miracle argument" which says that
scientific realism is the only conceivable explanation for the success of sci-
ence. Without assuming that science takes hold of the real world, the predic-
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tive success of science would be an utter miracle. But since there are no mira-
cles anvmore, realism is left as the only explanation for this success. The clas-
sic modern formulation of the argument is due to Hilary Putnam (although
earlier versions are found in the methodological literature).
The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philoso-
phy that doesn' t make the success of science a miracle. That the
terms in mature scientific theories typically refer (this formula-
tion is due Richard Boyd), that the theories accepted in a mature
science are typically approximately true, ... these statements are
viewed by the scientific realist ... as part of the only scientific
explanation of the success of science. (Putnam 1975, p. 73)
And the typical realist argument against idealism is that it makes
the success of science a 7niracle. ... And the modern positivist
has to leave it without explanation (the realist charges) that `elec-
tron calculi' and `space-time calculi' and `DNA-calculi' correctly
predict observable phenomena if, in reality, there are no elec-
trons, no curved space-time, and no DNA-molecules. ... But if
these objects don't really exist at all, then it is a miracle that a
theory ... which speaks of curved space-time successfully pre-
dicts phenomena. (Putnam 1978, pp. 18-19)
In its canonical formulation (likewise due to Putnam), scientific realism is
characterized by two principles:
(1) The theoretical terms in the mature sciences typically refer
to real objects.
(2) The theoretical laws in the mature sciences are typically ap-
proximately true (Putnam 1978, pp. 20-21).
The realist interpretation concerns the theoretically introduced concepts and
theoretically assumed mechanisms. These concepts and mechanisms are sup-
posed to correspond to really existing objects or processes. Scientific realists
usually add the clause that the currently accepted theories in physics, chemis-
try and biology represent mature science so that their central theoretical con-
cepts can be expected to refer to reality.
The miracle argument in favor of this view says that if a theory referred to
fictitious objects, it would be puzzling that it is able to correctly predict ob-
servable effects. Predicted observations are obviously not taken from experi-
ence but rather derived from theory. Non-realism is at a loss to account for
the fact that fictitious "calculi" were able to anticipate truthfully empirical
phenomena. After all, it would be an amazing feat if a theory about unicorns
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and dragons arrived at true predictions about horses and rhinos. lt would be
likewise highly astonishing if a theorv that referred to actually inexistent
curved space-time structures could adequately accommodate the observed ro-
tation periods of pulsars. By contrast, it is a natural explanation for such pre-
dictive success that curved space-time actuallv exists and that it is grasped at
least approximately correctly by inc theory.
Scientific realism thus explains the empirical success of science. This in-
volves a major shift in its conceptual status. The assumption that successful
theories in the mature sciences correspond to reality becomes an empirical
hypothesis that refers to the history of science and is buttressed by the actual
explanatory accomplishment of scientific theories.
4 Strong Predictive Sarecess and Genuine Reference
The miracle argument suggests an empirical test of the realist contention to
explain the success of science. Realism assumes that truth implies reference
so that reference of the theoretical terms is a necessary precondition for the
truth of the theoretical postulates. Further, a theory's truth is supposed to be
sufficient for its predictive success. A true theory mirrors reality and is em-
pirically successful for this reason. Consequently, the realist explanation for
the success of science suggests that there should be no successful theories
that lack reference.1
Larry Laudan has taken seriously this explanatory claim and subjected it to
historical examination. He came up with numerous examples of theories that
were once empirically successful but turned out later to be thoroughly mis-
taken in ontological respect (Laudan 1984a, pp. 225-226). Take 18°' century
phlogiston chemistry which furnished an account of combustion and the
phenomenon called calcination (i.e., the oxidation of metals in modern
terms). The pivot of this account was that a "principle," a nonmaterial, prop-
erty-bearing entity, left the body during the processes in question. The phlo-
giston theory enjoyed important explanatory successes in the decades around
1700. Likewise, the fluid theory of electricity was built around the assumption
of a weightless substance that was thought to be able to penetrate bodies and
1 This inference appears to be fallacious since the transirion from success to truth seems to
involve the fallacy of affirming the consequent. But realism conrends that a theon's truth
is the only conceivable explanation for its success, and with this auxiliare clause appended
the argument becomes deductively valid.
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to be a source of forces . This theory was empirically successful in the 18th
century .- Analogously, the optical ether was part of the highly successful opti-
cal theory of the 19,h century and formed an undisputed constituent of the
ontological inventory of science . In his Preface to Heinrich Hertz ' Princples of
Mechanics Hermann von Helmholtz gives credit to the experiments of the lat-
ter an electromagnetic waves and states as one of the conclusions to be
drawn from these experiments that "there can no longer be any doubt that
light-waves consist of electric vibrations in the all -pervading aether" (quoted
from Hacking 1983, p. 256).
Laudan ' s objections have established beyond reasonable doubt that the
miracle argument in its original , comprehensive form cannot be sustained.
Since empirically successful theories with nonreferring theoretical terms can
be identified in the history of science, reference to real entities is not neces-
sary for empirical success . However, the forte of this conclusion suffers from
Laudan's extremely broad notion of empirical success. A theory is said to be
successful if it offers confirmed predictions and explanations of a variety of
phenomena . Laudan adopts such a broad notion for the reason that a more
tight conception would tend to make science unsuccessful , with the result
that the realist explanandum might be in danger to evaporate (Laudan 1984a,
p. 222). Laudan's counterexamples consequently refer to theories that were
once successful in this weak sense and that according to present lights fad to
refer to reality.
But scientific realism cannot convincingly be grounded an such an unde-
manding notion of success . Consequently , scientific realism cannot be un-
dermined by counterexamples of this sort . A theory that is constructed such
that it fits certain known phenomena qualifies as successful in this Sense. Ke-
pler's laws of planetary motion or Boyle's law of ideal gases were more or less
read off from the available data and indeed matched these data-including
future observations of the same phenomena . But we aren't struck by such
2 It rnight be objected that these theories are not part of the "mature" sciences. It Gould be
said that neither chemistry nor the theory of electricity in the 180h are "mature" in the Sense
required by the realist so that the alleged counterexamples miss the realist contention. How-
ever, 1 argue below that phlogiston chernistry was empirically successful (see sec. 6); more-
over, it exhibited methodological virtues like unifying power that are considered today as
important distinctions. Denying maturity to the phlogiston theory around 1700 would de-
prive much of present-day science of maturity as well. In addition, as Worrall has pointed
out, without a more detailed elaboration, the mamrity clause has the air of an ad-hoc device.
Whenever the ontology of a theory is abandoned completely, it was immature in the First
place (Worrall 1989, p. 153).
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cases of explanatory and predictive success. These generalizations did what
they were designed to do. There is no tniracle involved here. And if there is
no explanandum, realism can hardly be credited with providing the explanans.
Accordingly, scientific realism cannot be grounded an explanatory and
predictive success sinpliciter. Rather, a more demanding variant of such suc-
cess has to be brought to bear. What matters is the successful expansion of a
theory's domain of application beyond its former boundaries. 1 call this dis-
tinguished type of predictive achievement "strong empirical success." What is
really miraculous is William Whewell's consilience of inductions (1858) and
Pierre Duhem's theoretical prediction of hitherto unknown laws (1906). It is
only the explanation of these two sorts of empirical success that could sup-
port the realist contention (Musgrave 1988, 232; Carrier 1991, pp. 25-26).
Consilience of inductions is characterized by the following two features.
(1) Laws that were taken to describe different kinds of phe-
nomena are unified by a theory. After the formulation of
the theory these phenomena are taken to result from a
common underlying process.
(2) This unification was not achieved by deliberate adaptation.
Rather, a theory designed to cope with one dass of facts
was later found to accommodate an additional, apparently
different set of phenomena. Unification was not achieved
by hand, as it were, but came about as an unexpected and
surprising coincidence.
One of Whewell's examples is Isaac Newton's hypothesis of universal gravita-
tion. As Whewell tells the Story, the hypothesis was introduced to account for
Johannes Kepler's third law and later found to explain the remaining Keple-
rian laws, along with lots of other seemingly unrelated astronomical phenom-
ena like the precession of the equinoxes (Whewell 1858, pp. 153-154).
Wie-well goes an to argue that consilience reliably indicates that the theory
has grasped an aspect of the real world. Hypotheses that are merely con-
structed to match the data will fail when new phenomena are discovered. If a
hypothesis applies to these novel circumstances as well, it must represent an
element of reality.
But when the hypothesis, of itself and without adjustment for
the purpose, gives us the rule and reason of a dass [of factsl not
contemplated in its construction, we have a criterion of its real-
ity, which has never been produced in favour of falsehood.
(Whewell 1858, p. 155)
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On1y if we assume that the theory reflects the real state of affairs, do we un-
derstand that and how consilience can arise.
This train of thought is instantiated by Jean Perrin's argument in favor of
the reality of molecules (advanced between 1908 and 1913). Perrin drew at-
tention to the fact that the quantity now known as Avogadro's number (and
referring to the constant number of molecules per mole of anv substance)
could be measured in divergent ways. The relevant methods rehed an such
apparently unrelated phenomena as Brownian motion, electrolysis together
with Robert Millikan's determination of the electron charge, or Max Plancks
radiation law (Brush 1976, p. 697). Inspection of the results revealed a re-
markable numerical agreement which Perrin took as a cogent reason for the
existente of molecules (Salmon 1984, pp. 214-220).
Our wonder is aroused at the very remarkable agreement found
between values derived from the consideration of such widely
different phenomena. Seeing that ... the numbers ... agree
among themselves, without discrepancy, for all the methods
employed, the real existente of the molecules is given a prob-
ability bordering an certainty. (Perrin, quoted in: Salmon 1984,
p. 219).
Put in Whewell's terms, Perrin's argument comes down to an inference from
successful consilience of inductions to veracity. Molecular theory establishes a
relation between regularities that would appear completely unconnected oth-
erwise. If Avogadro's number did not refer to some underlying molecular re-
ality, the numerical agreement among the different results would seem utterly
miraculous. Only by assuming that the diverse methods capture the Same as-
pect of reality, can resort to a miracle be avoided.
A similar argument is developed by Duhem who, unlike Whewell, focuses
an the successful prediction of novel facts, i.e., of empirical generalizations
formerly unknown to science. If a theory is regarded as a purely artificial sys-
tem, Duhem argues, we cannot expect it to entail successful predictions of
hitherto undiscovered regularities. On this view, such a prediction would
have to be considered a "marvelous feat of chance." If, by contrast, the the-
ory is assumed to grasp the real order of things, it is natural to expect that
there are some previously undetected novelties hidden in it.3
3 It will appear amazing that Duhem who was presented above as one of the authors of the
instrumentalist argument (see sec. 2) should have committed himself to such seemingly real-
ist views. But there are important differentes between Duhem's "natural classification" and
realism proper. 1 will come back to this issue in sec. B.
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The highest test, therefore, of our holding a classification as a
natural one is to ask it to indicate in advance things which the
future alone will reveal. And rohen the experiment is made and
confirms the predictions obtained from our theory, we feel
strengthened in our conviction that the relations established by
our reason among abstract notions truly correspond to relations
among things. (Duhem 1906, p. 28)
Duhem's example is the prediction of "Poisson's Spot" by Augustin Fresnel's
wave theory of light. In 1819, Denis Poisson derived a seemingly grotesque
consequence from Fresnel's recently proposed theory that regarded light as
transverse oscillatory motion in a mechanical ether. According to this theory,
Poisson argued, a bright Spot should appear in the middle of the shadow of a
circular screen lit by a point source of light-a result he deemed absurd.
When this startling prediction was actually verified, the theory was considered
to contain an element of truth (Duhem 1906, pp. 29-30).
In light of these considerations, a more specific and more tenable version
of the miracle argument can be given. What seems astonishing from a non-
realist point of view is the capacity of some theories to successfully predict
formerly unknown effects (Duhem) or novel relations between known gener-
alizations (Whewell) without adjustment for this purpose. Such predictions
refer to new types of phenomena or new types of relations between them.
The amended miracle argument says, then, that without assuming that science
captures reality, streng empirical success remains inexplicable and miraculous.
Put this way, there is some plausibility in the claim that the success of science
generates an explanatory challenge to the non-realist.
5 Non-Realist Explanaiions for the Success of Science
Naturally enough, the diverse brands of non-realism or instrumentalism at-
tempt to meet this challenge. Let me briefly review some non-realist explana-
tions for the empirical success of science.
5.1 Methodology Instead of'Truth
The empirical success of theories is attributed to the strengths and virtues of
scientific method. Bas van Fraassen and Larry Laudan point out that theories
are subjected to a large number of demanding examinations. They are con-
fronted with the evidente and only accepted if they pass tests that would have
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detected empirical inadequacies if there were any. Successful theories have
come out first in a "fierte competition" among rivahng approaches. Only
those accounts can be expected to survive in this methodological battlefield
that lasch an to the real regularities of nature. That is, only truly empirically
adequate theories pass this tough selection process unscathed. What eventu-
ally counts in the miracle argument is nothing but empirical adequacy, and
this feature can readily be explained by recourse to demanding standards for
judging theories. It is no wonder from an instrumentalist perspective that ac-
cepted theories are empirically successful. They were selected for precisely
this property. Empirical success can thus be explained by appeal to the high
Standards of evaluation employed in science; recourse to truth is gratuitous
(Van Fraassen 1980, 39-40; see also Laudan 1977, 127; Laudan 1984b,
pp. 97-101).
However, what is lost in this anti-realist explanation is the difference be-
tween simple empirical adequacy and strong empirical success. The methodo-
logical explanation aims at predictive success in general and misses the out-
standing impact of strong success. The selection for empirical adequacy must
always proceed an the basis of known evidence. Theories cannot possibly be
judged in terms of future achievements. The successful anticipation of a new
kind of effect or a new sort of relation among effects cannot be confirmed
using presently available data. The surprising and unforeseen character of
these future distinctions is missed by taking them to be part of simple empiri-
cal adequacy.
5.2 KeciprocatAdaption Betzveen Data and Observational Consequences
The miracle argument proceeds an the assumption of a close connection be-
tween theoretical principles and observational consequences. Only an that as-
sumption can empirical success clearly be credited to the principles. As Barry
Barnes argues, however, this assumption is somewhat remote from reality.
The application of a theory to experience is an intricate procedure into which
a large number of auxiliaries, models, and analogies enter. All these mediating
constructions are fashioned with an eye an bringing theory and experience
into harmony. Empirical success can at most to a small extent be attributed to
the virtues of the corresponding theory; it is rather due to the practice of de-
veloping the theory in view of the data and to specify the data in light of the
theoretical claims (Barnes 2004, in this vol.).
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But this approach equallv misses the exceptional status of strong success.
Neither confumed novel predictions nor unintended unifications can be the
result of tailoring a theory to the extant evidente. It is precisely the fact that
no such explicit adaptation can produce strong success that underlies the In-
tuition of its special and distinctive character. It is true, Barnes might repl
that the novel predictions could speciously be borne out by adapting the data
to the theoretical requirements. But this option would demand, ferst, an ex-
treme and fairly implausible malleability of facts and, second, would in any
event be ruled out regarding novel unifications. After all, Whewell's consil-
ience distinguishes cases in which theory and data are at hand before their
mutual agreement is recognized.
5.3 The `Round-of-Shot" Argasment
Non-realism might object that strong successes are indeed nothing but
chance hits and do not reveal any underlying conformity between theory and
-reality. However, as the objection proceeds, these cases still do not involve a
miraculous feat of chance since they are supplemented with lots of failed at-
tempts. As a matter of fact, a large number of assumptions advanced in sci-
ence are misguided and empirically inadequate; they are abandoned quickly.
Others only serve to account for those phenomena they were designed to
tope with. All these hypotheses fall short of the demanding Standards implicit
in the amended miracle argument. Given such a vast number of less than per-
suasive theoretical endeavors, it can safely be expected for statistical reasons
alone that some theoretical innovations not only capture the known data but
also anticipate novel types of facts or relations. Strong success is really due to
chance, but unamazingly so since these rare lucky events are surrounded by
an ocean of abortive attempts.
This "round-of-shot" argument is based an the assessment that science is
far less successful than the advocates of the miracle argument presuppose.4
Scientific theorizing for the most part produces defective and flawed ac-
counts-as most of the shots go astray. This immense number of misses is
ignored in typical historical reconstructions. Focusing an the celebrated
achievements of creative geniuses covers all the flimsy ideas and ramshackle
4 1 understand Holm Tetens to say that the world outside the laboratory is governed by a vast
number of intertwined influences whose complem. tv severely restricts the descriptive and
predicuve success of science (Tetens 2004, in this volume, p. 88).
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conceptions with benign neglect that make up the mainstream of scientific re-
search.
lt is true, since the miracle argument for scientific realism relies an the
empirical success of science, scientific realism would be severely threatened if
science turned out to be rather unsuccessful in the relevant sense. The viabil-
ity of the miracle argument and the round-of-shot rejoinder alike depend an
how successful science really is. Both parties to the dispute rely an a historical
premise so that empirical research could contribute to mitigating the contrast.
The critical parameter is the frequency or fraction of strong success in the
mature sciences. 1 admit to not having conducted a systematic survey to this
effect. Yet judging from the circumstantial historical record 1 am familiar
with, the idea that scientific creativity largely resembles a random walk that
once in a while stumbles upon a grain of truth haphazardly and otherwise
gets lost in a maze of error and misjudgment does not strike me as overly
plausible empirically.
6 Strong Empirical Success and the History of Science
1 conclude that non-realist accounts of strong success are unconvincing
whereas realism offers a natural explanation. This explanation amounts to the
claim that reference is necessary for strong success which translates into a bis-
torical hypothesis: theories whose central theoretical terms lack reference to
real objects or processes must neither enjoy Duhemian predictive success nor
Whewellian consilience of inductions. The next step is to examine how this
hypothesis fares in light of the history of science. An empirical rebuttal of the
amended miracle argument requires cases of nonreferring, strongly successful
theories.
Whether or not a theory refers to reality can be judged noncircularly an
the Basis of present scientific knowledge. The reason is that scientific realism
includes the commitment that the presently accepted theories in the mature
sciences are typically approximately true (see sec. 3). This realist contention
entails the following retention requirement for a theory component to be inter-
preted realistically, it is necessary that it be retained across scientific change. If
science is supposed to successfully capture realist', the insights gained an such
occasions must not disappear in the ensuing development. A realist will surely
be content with an approximative retention of a theoretical feature involved
in the production of strong success. But some sort of cumulative theory
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change is required in order for scientific reahsm to be a viable position. Con-
verselv, what is excluded is that a theory which once enjoyed strong success is
jettisoned completely without leaving any ontological trace in present-day sci-
ence (Carrier 1993, pp. 393-394; see Worrall 1989, pp. 144, 146).
Orte important caveat is to be added before 1 enter historv. In mang cases
the predictive success of wrong theories stemmed from their correct aspects.
Fresnel's strongly successful prediction of Poisson's Spot arose within an
ether theory of light which is mistaken and nonreferring for this reason alone.
But the prediction did in no way rely an this ether mechanical framework, hut
rather an the hvpothesis that light is a transverse wave. And this hypothesis is
approximately true in light of the present state of knowledge. Thus, the reten-
tion requirement is to be brought to bear solely an those features of a theory
that were responsible or unavoidable for the production of strong success.
Philip Kitcher distinguishes between working posits and presuppositional
posits of a theory. The former are essential for the explanatory achievements
of the theory, whereas the latter merely express a commitment to entities
whose existence appears to be a prerequisite of the truth of the theory.
Kitcher's example of a presuppositional posit is the ether in Fresnel's theory.
This all-pervasive mechanical medium was only extremely rarely put to ex-
planatory work. It was rather thought to be a necessary precondition in order
for a wave account of light propagation to be true. The existente of the ether
appeared as a presupposition of the truth of any undulatory optical explana-
tion. Kitcher surmi.ses that historical arguments for scientific realism should
only address the trustworthiness and retention of working posits, whereas
presuppositional posits should not be taken seriously in ontological respect
(Kitther 1993, pp. 142-149).
Consequently, possible historical counterexamples to the amended miracle
argument need to present cases of strong success as produced by erroneous
working posits. The complication is that a working posit might be correct in
the relevant sense while being part of a thoroughly flawed account. Consider
the prediction of the phases of Venus by both Copernican and Tychonic as-
tronomy. Both theories entailed the startling novelty that Venus should ex-
hibit the full cycle of phases just like the Moon. This feature was ruled out
within Ptolemaic astronomy; its discovery by Galileo in 1610 thus constituted
strong empirical success. Yet the two thus distinguished accounts are pro-
foundly mistaken. Neither is the solar system composed of a superposition of
uniformly rotating spherical shells that carry the planets along (as Copernicus
supposed), nor is the Earth located at the center of the Sun's orbit while the
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other planets revolve around the sun (as Tycho would have it). This episode
does not militate against the amended miracle argument since the novel pre-
diction was brought about by the hvpothesis that Venus revolves around the
Sun rather than the Earth. This hypothesis constitutes the working posit, and
it is considered true rill the present day.
Viable counterexamples to the miracle argument can only refer to strongly
successful theories whose relevant \vorking posits First produced the strong
success and were yet later given up completely and left no vestiges in the sci-
ence of today. 1 will present two such examples.
7 Hictory ar the Touchrtone of tbe Miracle Argrument
The ferst example is taken from the history of the later phlogiston theory. 1
briefly mentioned that phlogiston was taken as an immaterial bearer of the
property of combustibility (among others), that it was thought to be con-
tained in combustible materials and in metals and to be released in burning
and calcination (see sec. 4). Combustion and calcination thus involve a de-
composition into phlogiston and a residue specific for the substance at hand.
In 1766, this account was borne out empirically by Henry Cavendish. He
dissolved some metals (fron, tin, and zinc) in some acids (hydrochloric acid,
diluted sulfuric acid) and found that an extraordinarily light, extremely com-
bustible gas escaped that burned without any recognizable residue.5 Caven-
dish tried to ascertain that the inflammable air, as he called the new gas, did
not originate from the acid and concluded that it was released from the metal.
Given the background knowledge of the period, a light, combustible gas,
burning without residue and contained in metals Gould be nothing other than
phlogiston. Consequently, Cavendish believed he had produced pure phlogis-
ton. Judged by present lights, Cavendish had managed to set free hydrogen
from the acid (contrary to what he thought he had established). One of the
pertinent chemical reactions is: Fe + 2HC1 -* FeC12 + H2.
Proceeding from Cavendish's account, Joseph Priestley in 1782 managed
to predict successfully a formerly unknown effect. If inflammable air is pure
phlogiston, so his reasoning went, it should be able to supply the phlogiston
necessary to transform a calx into the corresponding metal. It should be pos-
sible to turn a calx into the metal through absorption of inflammable air.
5 Cavendish noticed that watet appeared in burning the gas but he interpreted this water as
moisture dissolved in the gas and deposited in combustion.
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Priestley succeeded in confirming this novel prediction. He heated several
calxes in inflammable air and observed that the gas almost completely disap-
peared and that the caLxes viere converted into the respective metals. Priestley
beheved he had shown beyond reasonable doubt that the calxes had taken up
the inflammable air and thereby regained their metallic properties.
Put in modern terms, Priestley had unwittingly synthesized watet in his
experiment. As a result of the heating, the metallic oxides gave off oxygen
which combined with the surrounding hydrogen to form watet. One of the
reactions that occurred was: FeO + H, -* Fe + H2O. Priestley noticed the
emergence of watet, but assumed it was moisture already contained in the in-
flammable air.
Priestley managed to correctly predict a novel regularity that was unknown
to science before and not to be expected prior to the formulation of Caven-
dish's version of the phlogiston theory. This theory was essential for arriving
at the prediction; it was clearly a working posit, not a mere presupposition.
However, the underlying account seems wrong an all counts. Priestley's result
expresses the reductive properties of hydrogen which are due to the fact that
hydrogen easily gives off electrons. And this is a far cry from the capacity to
supply calxes with phlogiston. Priestley achieved a strong success using a the-
ory completely deprived of reference by the later course of scientific progress
(Carrier 1991, pp. 29-30).
The second example is taken from the caloric theory of heat according to
which heat is a particular substance. Because of its material nature, heat is
governed by a conservation law. Temperature is identical with the concentra-
tion of caloric; i.e., the matter of heat is more dense in warm bodies than in
cold ones. Caloric is assumed to be composed of particles that attract the par-
ticles of other substances with forces specific for the substance involved and
diminishing with increasing distance. This approach was held to apply to the
particles of ordinary substances as well, but with one exception. The particles
of bodies attract one another, as is evidenced by cohesion, whereas the ca-
loric particles repel one another, as thermal expansion demonstrates. In
thermal expansion the hegt particles are pushed apart by the repulsive force
between them and carry along the particles of the heated body.
On this account, the solid state is characterized by an equilibrium between
the attractive forces among caloric and body particles, an the one hand, and
the repulsive forces among the caloric particles, an the other. The former
forces are specific to the substance involved which entails that the thermal
expansion of solid bodies varies from substance to substance. This was well
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known for Jong. Gases are characterized by the accumulation of caloric; after
all, they can be produced by heating. This means that caloric repulsion is en-
tirely dominant. In the gaseous state the particles of the body are pushed so
far apart that the short-range attractive forces among them are no longer ef-
fective and the repulsive forces among the caloric particles prevail. The elastic
properties of gases bear witness to this prevalence of the repulsive forces
within the matter of heat. This means that the thermal expansion of gasen is
nothing but expansion of caloric. It follows that the rate of expansion is the
same for all gases; it does not vary with the chemical nature of the gas. In
1802, John Dalton and Joseph-Louis Gay-Lussac independently recognized
that this was indeed true and thereby confirmed a novel prediction of caloric
theory (Carrier 1991, pp. 30-31).
The modern explanation of the equality of the thermal expansion of gases
is that the intensity of substance-specific electric forces between the mole-
cules is negligible (which is in turn due the great distances between the mole-
cules and their large kinetic energies). For this reason, gases can be viewed as
collections of colliding point mass particles, which processes can be analyzed
using the laws of mechanics. These laws indiscriminately apply to particles of
all substances, and the analysis indeed yields the law of Dalton and Gay-
Lussac.
This case likewise exhibits the features of strong success. A generalization
is anticipated an theoretical grounds and Borne out empirically. The predic-
tion depended critically an the caloric account. If this account is renounced,
there is no basis to expect any differente in the thermal behavior of solids
and gares, respectively. The properties of the matter of heat are actually in-
voked in the explanation, not merely presupposed; they are working posits.
Still, the central concepts of this caloric explanation are entirely nonreferring.
Its pivot is the repulsive forces of the matter of heat. But there is no matter
of heat, and no other repulsive forces play any rote in the modern account of
the effect.
Both case studies show that the miracle argument is inappropriate in its
amended form as well. They make it clear that strong empirical success may
occur although the pertinent theoretical terms lack reference. Strong success
is possible without retention of the relevant laws or explanatory mechanisms.
Since retention is necessary for attributing reference to the theoretical quanti-
ties in question, these cases constitute counterexamples to the realist claim
that strong empirical success demands reference of the theoretical terms used.
The upshot is, rather, that reference is not necessary for strong success. Al-
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though there is nothing in nature that resembled phlogiston or caloric, the
corresponding theories enjoyed strong predictive success. It follows that
strong empirical success cannot be explained by reference. There is no basis
for the judgment that these theories were successful because their central
concepts referred to reality. The realist explanation of the success of science
cannot be sustained.
8 The Retention of the Class/icatory Structure
The argument has come to a deadlock. On the one hand, the miracle argu-
ment, at least in its amended version, is intuitively sound. It seems undeniable
that there has to be a reason for strong success; the latter should not count as
miraculous. It certainly constitutes a highly remarkable achievement if a the-
ory Looks further in empirical respect than all observers and experimenters
before. The realist explanation affords such a reason and is primafade persua-
sive. But these attractive prospects count for nothing if the argument is not in
conformity with the historical record and thus falls as an explanation for
strong success in the history of science. The nadir is reached: we are at a loss
to understand how strong success is possible.
But there is a path leading upward again. It is shown by the recognition
that the two explanations did not miss the point in such a large measure as
the foregoing presentation might suggest. In fact, one feature is preserved
across the theoretical change, namely, the ordering or classification of the
phenomena covered. Put more concretely, phenomena bound together by
and viewed as results of a common process or law in the outdated approach
continue to be related in the up-to-date framework. The theory-based classifi-
cation of the phenomena as being alike is retained across the theoretical steift.
What has once been connected through strong success remains to be viewed
as being of the Same kind afterward.
As regards the phlogiston case, Cavendish's experiment was interpreted as
the release of phlogiston which involved the calcination of the metal em-
ployed. Priestlev's empirical demonstration of the reductive properties of hy-
drogen was seen as the reversal of this process: the calx takes up phlogiston
and thereby turns into metal. Thus, both reactions were regarded as instantia-
tions of the Same chemical process; their only differente was that this process
was going off in opposite directions.
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Both phenomena are still considered equal in kind in modern chemistry.
Cavendish has produced an oxidation, Priestley its converse, i.e., a reduction.
lt is true, this judgment is based an the modern concepts of "oxidation" and
"reduction.". An oxidation in this sense involves a loss of electrons, a reduc-
tion is tantamount to electron gain. Viewed from this perspective, the metal is
oxidized under the action of the acid in Cavendish's experiment. In chloride
formation, for instance, electrons are shifted from the iron to the chlorine
(see sec. 7). In Priestley's reversal, by contrast, the oxide releases oxygen and
is reduced to metal. This involves an electron shift from oxygen to metal.
Correspondingly, both reactions are still regarded as equivalent in kind and as
merely proceeding in contrary directions. Their classification is retained in
spite of the drastic changes in the content of the pertinent theories.
The Same lesson accrues from the caloric example. The strongly success-
ful explanation drew an a connection between interpreting a gas as a univer-
sal state of matter and deriving the equality of themal expansion for all gases.
The argument attributed gaseous properties to the accumulation of caloric
awith die result that all substances could in principle become gasiform. It was
often believed that gasen are particular substances; some (like air) are elastic
by their nature, and others (like earth or water) are not. On the basis of this
same process of accumulation of heat matter, caloric theory predicted the
universal agreement of the expansion rates. lt is the physical nature of a gas
that accounts both for its being a general state of matter and for its like ex-
pansion. Both facts are consequences of a common underlying mechanism.
This connection is faithfully preserved in the kinetic theory of gases. The
mechanical analysis of the molecular structure of gases suggests that gases are
a state of matter in general, and it entails at the same time that their thermal
expansion raten should agree. Again, although the content of the respective
theories has changed dramatically, the classification established among the
phenomena has remained unaltered.
This discussion suggests the following conjecture: If a theory predicts a
novel effect by relating it to another effect, i.e., by assuming both effects to
be produced by the same underlying process or mechanism, the two are tied
together truthfully. That is, a common bond of this sort reflects a real con-
nection. It is tempting (though not supported by the above examples) to gen-
eralize this conjecture to cases of consilient unification. If two laws are related
by consilience of inductions, this relation captures a real sameness in kind
(Carrier 1991, pp. 32-33).
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This conception resembles Duhem's notion of a "natural classification." 1
portrayed Duhem as one of the authors of the instrumentalist and the miracle
argument alike (see sec. 2, sec. 4)-which might appear inconsistent. But Du-
hem does not employ the miracle argument so as to show that concepts used
in strongly predictively successful theories refer to real entities. For Duhem it
is the relations that such concepts induce among the phenomena that reflect
the ontological order. Strongly successful theories tend to establish natural
classifications that grasp the real relations of equality in kind. Strongly suc-
cessful theories reveal the actual organization of the phenomena, not their
real nature, as standard scientific reahsm would have it (Duhem 1906,
pp. 24-27).
The realism of natural kinds 1 advocate takes strong empirical success as a
suitable basis for a realist taxonomy. It is the relation of sameness in kind that
provides the continuity at the theoretical level that is required by the miracle
argument. Relations among the phenomena are the stuff that reality is made
of. The historical claim associated with this Position is that phenomena once
connected by strong success continue to be considered in science as being
equal in kind. Such bonds are forged by nature. Let no man put them asun-
der.
9 Family Stories, or.• Kind-Realism and Related Breeds
The miracle argument in its standard form embodies the inference from suc-
cess to truth. I take it that the preceding discussion has made it clear that this
reasoning is in need of further refinement or amendment. The tenability of
the miracle argument crucially depends an how the notions of falsity and suc-
cess are conceived precisely. One Option for preserving the miracle intuition
is to say that the wrong but successful theories that apparently militate against
this intuition were not completely off the mark, but rather contained an ele-
ment of truth, and that it was this element that was responsible for the suc-
cess of the theories in question. One might also say that not just any old con-
firmed prediction counts as success, but only exceptional achievements. In
the foregoing sections 1 combined both these options and argued to confine
the proper import of the miracle argument to those parts of a theory that
were essential for the production of strong empirical success.
Howard Sankey rightly feels that the type of scientific realism that might
emerge from a qualified miracle argument of this sort is much more restricted
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than many realists would wish to defend. After all, the argument grants realist
bearing only to a comparatively small fraction of the theoretical content of
advanced science. Sankey suggests to avoid such restrictions by focusing an
the methods of science. As he argues, "the rules of method are
truth-conducive tools of inquiry, which nerve as reliable means for obtaining
truth" (Sankey 2004, in this volume, p. 70).
1 graut at once that it would be nice to have truth-conducive rules for the-
ory judgment and theoretical progress. But no such rule I'm aware of is justi-
fiably of the requisite sort. We can't possibly select theories according to their
truth or verisimilitude. The methodological rule to identify significant truths
is entirely void. What we do instead is to subject theories to demanding tests
as to their empirical adequacy and other methodological virtues. This is pre-
cisely the alternative to the realist explanation of scientific success that Van
Fraassen and Laudan suggest: it is scientific method rather than truth that ac-
counts for success (see sec. 5). Ort this approach, the appeal to truth is an idle
wheel that does not yield an explanatory extra for the success of science.
Sankey's account needs to be supplemented with an argument that explains
by virtue of which property a methodological rule is conducive to truth.
This concern is deepened by turning to historical examples. Classical
gravitation theory should certainly meet Sankey's truth-conducive stan-
dards-or there aren't any. Still, the theory was superseded by general relativ-
ity theory which entails a quite different ontology with respect to gravitational
phenomena. Gravitation is no longer considered as a force that drives bodies
off their inertial course; it is rather thought to influence the structure of
space-time and to determine in this way what inertial motion Looks like. In
spite of their small divergences at the empirical level, Newtonian and Ein-
steinian accounts of gravitation employ deeply contrasting explanatory
mechanisms and devise divergent schemes of the nature of gravity.
It seems, then, that Sankey's rules cannot be shown to be conducive to
truth; following them may yet lead one astray in ontological respect. For this
reason 1 fail to see a justification for his more comprehensive realism. The
amended rniracle argument restricts realism in scope, to be sure, but puts it
an a more solid foundation. It seems that we have to choose between the
broad scope of realist claims and the strength of the argumentative underpin-
ning of realist ambitions. Realism can be conceived as a broad but weakly
backed Position and, alternatively, as a narrow but strongly supported one.
The line I am following can be understood as a plea for the second Option.
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While the kind-realism 1 defend is distinguished from more sweeping or
comprehensive brands of realism, it is similar to John Worrall's structural re-
alism (which is derived from Henri Poincare rather than Duhem). What is
preserved across ontological disruptions is the mathematical structure used
for capturing the phenomena. The mathematical form of the Lauts provide an
element of continuity at the theoretical level over and above the reproduction
of empirical content. Consider the transition from Fresnel's optics to James
Maxwell's electrodynamics. Fresnel conceived of light as mechanical ether vi-
brations whereas Maxwell regarded it as electromagnetic Field oscillations.
The theoretical content and the relevant entities differ drastically. Fresnel was
quite wrong about the nature of light and about the explanatory mechanisms.
\y/hat has remained intact, however, is the structure of the equations. The
relevant laws are formally similar. Although they relate different entities in
each theory, the relations themselves coincide. The predictive success of
Fresnel's theory iested an the fact that it had captured the relations between
optical phenomena (Worrall 1989, pp. 158-159).
The transition from Fresnel to Maxwell is a special case in that Fresnel's
equations were adopted unchanged-if reinterpreted. A much more common
pattern is that the old equations reappear as limiting cases of the new ones.
This approximate continuity of structure explains why otherwise mistaken
theories managed to score exceedingly well empirically. In summary, Worrall
presents structural realism as combining harmoniously two prima fade incom-
patible features: it does justice to the miracle argument while at the same time
recognizing the depth of the theoretical rifts running through the history of
science (Worrall 1989, pp. 160-161).
Worrall's structural realism and my realism of kinds share the same basic
orientation. Both views stress the reality of relations, whereas no such reality
is attributed to the related quantities. But structural realism highlights mathe-
matical relations as the focus of scientific realism, whereas kind-realism is in-
tended to be more ecumenical. Equivalence classes of phenomena that are es-
tablished by nonmathematical explanations are accepted as candidates for real
equality in kind as well. Further, 1 restrict attribution of reality to theoretical
elements connected by strongly successful explanations. Not any structural
continuity counts. All depends an the explanatory scores gained by the perti-
nent theory.
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10 Establisbing a Natura! Taxonomy of Kinds
It is in order to briefly recapitulate the structure of the argument and to
roughly indicate the overall view emerging from these considerations . Here is
what the argument comes down to. Adopting scientific realism entails a
commitment to a realist interpretation of at least one aspect involved in con-
temporary scientific theories . Relevant aspects could be theory- induced ex-
planatory mechanisms , or entities or equivalence classes among the phenom-
ena (i.e., natural kinds). Such a realist interpretation suggests that earlier
theories that were once confirmed in roughly the Same fashion as their suc-
cessors are now should likewise be trustworthy ontologically with regard to
the aspect in question . From this follows the retention condition : any feature
of a scientific theory that is to be counted as real has to be retained across
scientific change. This condition is accepted by realists and non -realists alike.
Of course , one is free to say that the reality out there is distinct from every-
thing science has come up with in the past. But this contention would no
longer qualify as "scientific" realism. The latter position involves a commit-
ment to the ontology suggested by successful scientific theories-which en-
tails the retention condition . The anti-realist argument from scientific change
likewise proceeds from this condition . Laudan's criticism (see sec. 4) operates
precisely an this basis : since nothing significant is retained , the realist claitns
are rnistaken.
The second step of the argument brings to bear the judgment that strong
empirical success is an extraordinary , astonishing achievement and deserves
explanation . The miracle argument provides a possible reason, namely, that
the relevant aspect of the thus distinguished theory reflects something real.
The argument in and of itself does not specify what constitutes this veridical
aspect . The retention condition serves to single out whether laws and mecha-
nisms, entities or natural kinds allows for a realist interpretation. Features of
strongly successful theories that are later abandoned are thereby excluded
from the inventory of nature . The historical record tentatively suggests that
only the last item, i.e., natural kinds, may legitimately be interpreted realisti-
cally.
The claim is , then , that the miracle argument is all right in principle; it has
only been applied to the wrong subject matter. The argument supports a real-
ism of kinds that focuses an relations between phenomena and is distinct
from the more common brands of realism that involve commitment to the
existente of entities . Kind-realism claims that science sometimes manages to
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sort phenomena into the right equivalence classes; nothing is thereby said
about the criteria used for this purpose. As the two case-studies were in-
tended to show, the properties and mechanisms that served to tie the various
phenomena together are subject to drastic historical alteration. Mv contention
is that the classification induced by strong success corresponds in its relevant
aspects to the natural order among the phenomena. This entails no claim as
to the reference of the concepts and criteria brought to bear in the classifica-
tion procedure. There is no referential de between phlogiston and electrons
or between the repulsive forces of caloric and the kinetic energy of molecules.
It is the relations they impose an the phenomena, not their natures, that co-
incide.
The realism of kinds 1 advocate involves a markedly non-Aristotehan ap-
proach to kinds. In the Aristotelian tradition, kinds are individuated through
their essential properties. The dass of human beings is rightly determined by
the property "rational animal," not by the attribute "featherless biped." 1 sug-
gest to individuate kinds without comtitment to any particular set of proper-
ties. My claim is that only the induced taxonomy, but not the theoretical
means used for establishing it, is (in specific cases) justifiably to be considered
real. It is true, our prime epistemic access to kinds is through theories; kinds
are deterrnined by relying an theories. Still, it is only the results, and not the
means used for their production, that are arguably reliable ontologically. It is
the relation of sameness in kind among phenomena that sometimes deserves
our ontological confidence. No such case can be made for the explanatory
mechanisms employed for specifying such relations, nor for the entities in-
volved in them. It is clear that the phenomena contained in these equivalence
classes are similar in some particular respect. But precisely what this respect is
cannot reliably be specified. Only the relation of sameness in kind, not the
properties underlying this equivalence, is trustworthy ontologically.
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